Mr. Justice Frankfurter -- Law and Choice by Mendelson, Wallace
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 10 
Issue 2 Issue 2 - February 1957 Article 8 
2-1957 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter -- Law and Choice 
Wallace Mendelson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Wallace Mendelson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter -- Law and Choice, 10 Vanderbilt Law Review 333 (1957) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol10/iss2/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER-LAW AND CHOICE
WALLACE MENDELSON*
Our essential weakness-that of making mistakes-will not be
eradicated by a central agency. Morris Cohen
In the past the courts have reached their conclusions largely deduc-
tively from preconceived notions and precedents. The method I have
tried to employ in arguing cases before them has been inductive,
reasoning from the facts. Louis D. Brandeis
In this and like communities public sentiment is everything. With
public sentiment nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed;
consequently he who moulds public sentiment goes deeper than he
who enacts statutes and decisions. He makes statutes and decisions
possible or impossible to be executed. Abraham Lincoln
[T]he attitude of a society and of its organized political forces,
rather than its legal machinery, is the controlling force in the charac-
ter of free institutions. Mr. Justice R. H. Jackson
JUSTICE V. JUSTICE UNER LAW
In an opinion that seems destined to live as long as the ideals of
democracy survive, Justices Holmes and Brandeis rejected their col-
leagues' narrow conception of free speech, yet concurred in the judg-
ment affirming conviction.1 Though the accused had claimed protection
under the appropriate constitutional provision, she had failed at the
trial level to raise the "clear and present danger" issue. Raising it in
the Supreme Court was futile, thought Holmes and Brandeis, because
"Our power of review in this case is limited not only to the question
whether a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution was denied
[in the state court] ... but to the particular claims duly made below
and denied."2 It may be said, of course, that Holmes and Brandeis had
"no feel for the dominant issues"; that, preoccupied with "crochet
patches of legalism on the fingers of the case," they let a technicality
prevail over Justice. Others may suppose the two great judges, well
aware of what was at stake, deemed themselves not free to do Justice,
but bound to do justice under law, i.e., in accordance with that very
special allocation of function and authority which is the essence of
Federalism and the Separation of Powers. The point is, one's estimate
of a judge hangs on one's conception-articulate or otherwise-of the
judicial function.
* Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee.
1. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927).
2. Id. at 380. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's position in Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 8 (1949) was based on this principle.
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To those for whom the Supreme Court's first concern is Justice, a
great judge on that bench is an activist, one who does not readily
permit "technicalities" to frustrate the ultimate. It follows, of course,
that in so far as activism prevails the Court is the final governing
authority. For, to that extent, its basic job is to impose Justice upon
all other agencies of government, indeed upon the community itself.
But what is Justice? Not so long ago, activists among the "nine old
men" found it in a modified (read perverted) laissez-faire, called
Rugged Individualism. Modern activists see it is a humane and virile
libertarianism. Holmes facetiously suggested that its roots are in one's
"can't helps."3
All this is unacceptable to those who take the more modest view that
the Court's chief concern is justice under law. For them, the great
judge is the humilitarian, the respecter of those "technicalities" which
allocate among many agencies different responsibilities in the pursuit
of Justice. In this view, the Court's special function is to maintain a
constitutional balance between the several elements in a common
enterprise. The Court, so to speak, tends the machinery. What the
plant produces depends upon the management, i.e., the political
processes.
While these two views are distinct at their cores, they fuse into one
another at their peripheries. Both are deep in American culture.
Neither prevails to the complete exclusion of the other even in the
work of a single judge. Eventually, the ardent activist gives way to
a rule, just as his counterpart on occasion ignores rules for something
deemed transcendental. What is important is the tilt of a judge's
mind, his conception of the nature of his function and the depth of
his convictions. It is a matter of goal and tendency, not of absolutes.
Some insist. that regardless of what a judge should do, he cannot
long escape his own sense of Justice, i.e., his own bias. Perhaps de-
tachment is an illusion. Objectivity may belong to the gods-or to
demons. "Be that as it may," says Learned Hand, "we know that men
do differ widely in this capacity; and the incredulity which seeks to
discredit that knowledge is a part of the crusade against reason from
which we have already so bitterly suffered. We may deny-and, if we
are competent observers, we will deny-that no one can be aware of
the danger [of his bias] and in large measure provide against it."
Chief Judge Hand's career on the bench, like those of Holmes, Bran-
deis, Stone and Cardozo, are monuments to the truth of this insight.
Of the great dissenters in the days of laissez-faire activism only Mr.
Justice Stone remained on the Court to see the new libertarian activ-
3. That is, things which because of one's background are so familiar that
one can't help believing them. See HOLMES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPESS 310 (1920).
4. HAND, THE SPRUT op LIBERTY 218 (2d ed., Dilliard 1953).
[ VOL. 10
FELIX FRANKFURTER
ism after 1937. He was as unpersuaded by the one as by the other.
For in his view both entailed abuse of the judicial function. At the
close of a long career spanning the two quite different eras of judicial
Justice, he wrote a trusted friend, "My more conservative brethern in
the old days [read their preferences into legislation and] into the
Constitution as well. What they did placed in jeopardy a great and
useful institution of government. The pendulum has now swung to
the other extreme, and history is repeating itself. The Court is now in
as much danger of becoming a legislative and Constitution-making
body, enacting into law its own predilections, as it was then."5 As
Thomas Reed Powell put it, "Four of the Roosevelt appointees were
as determined in their direction, as four of their predecessors were
determined by attraction to the opposite pole."
'6
JUSTICE UNDER LAW AND THE PRINCIPLE OF POLARITY
Mr. Justice Frankfurter (it is no secret) is deeply humilitarian.
Plainly this is an acquired characteristic, a judicial mold superimposed
upon a powerfully active and thoroughly libertarian personality (again
no secret). If to some his humility seems exaggerated-breastbeating
it has been called-that may be the measure of the struggle within
him or within the Court. Just as Holmes was more skeptical, so he
was less vocal in his humility. In any case, there can be no doubt of
the deep Holmesian mark upon Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Before he
took his seat upon the bench he was the intimate personal and profes-
sional confidant of Holmes, as well as Brandeis, during the whole, long
course of their struggle against the activism of "the nine old men."
The shared ardours of that contest must have reinforced what Pro-
fessor Frankfurter was learning as teacher of federal jurisdiction at
Harvard, namely, that since the Supreme Court cannot review more
than a drop in the flood of American litigation, by long established
principle that drop must be selected not on the basis of Justice to
any litigant, but in the interest of balance among the various elements
in the governmental structure. Moreover, if the Court takes jurisdic-
5. As quoted in MASON, SECURITY THROUGH FREEDOM 145-46 (1955). In
this, in their view of the Court as a balancer of interests, and in their disdain
for abstractions Justices Stone and Frankfurter were in full accord. Com-
pared with this area of agreement their differences were small. See MAsON,
op. cit. supra, app. The trend of voting records suggests that as the liber-
tarians became more aggressive these differences diminished. See Mendelson,
Clear and Present Danger-From Shenk to Dennis, 52 CoLum. L. REV. 313
(1952). Obviously the libertarians read much more in Stone's famous foot-
note 4, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), than
its author intended. Cf. MASON, op. cit. supra at 125-37. Indeed there is some
doubt whether Stone wrote, or accepted, the crucial first paragraph of that
footnote. BRADEN, THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 571,
580 &n.28 (1948). ,




tion on the one ground and decides on the other, balance is jeopardized
and though Justice (in its then current version) be done for a few,
the result is hardly fair to the many whose cases, however worthy,
cannot for physical limitations hope to reach the judicial summit,
What Paul Freund has said of Mr. Justice Brandeis is relevant here.
"[H]e would not be seduced by the quixotic temptation to right every
fancied wrong which was paraded before him. The time was always
out of joint but he was not [commissioned] to set it right.... Husband-
ing his time and energies as if the next day were to be his last, he
steeled himself, like a scientist in the service of man, against the
enervating distraction of countless tradgedies he was not meant to
relieve. His concern for jurisdictional and procedural limits reflected,
on the technical level, an essentially Stoic philosophy. For like Epicte-
tus, he recognized 'the impropriety of being emotionally affected by
what is not under one's control.' "7
Constitutional Law: The basic articulate premise of government in
the United States is the diffusion of power. Ultimate political control is
spread broadly among the people. This is the foundation of democracy.
Governmental power is divided between nation and states. This is
federalism. What is given to each is parcelled out among three
branches to accomplish the separation of powers. The purpose is not
merely-what schoolboys emphasize-to avoid a tyranical concentra-
tion of power. We seek as well the alignment of form to special func-
tion and above all that unique democratic efficiency, the promise that,
if decisions be slow, they will be acceptable to those who must live
with them.
For Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dispersion of the power to govern is
not just a sophomoric slogan. It is the essence of our system. That is
why he is so mindful of the political processes, state authority and
the division of labor between legislative, executive, administrative,
and judicial agencies. In Professor Jaffe's accurate account the Justice
"is forever disposing of issues by assigning their disposition to some
other sphere of competence.
' 8
But this is only half the problem. Familiarity obscures for us what
to outsiders is a marked characteristic of American government, our
habit of dressing up the most intricate social, economic and political
problems in legal jargon and presenting them to the courts for "ad-
judication." In view of this a foreign observer long ago concluded that,
if asked where he found the American aristocracy, i.e., the governing
class, he would reply "without hesitation . . . that it occupies the
judicial bench and bar."9 The short of it is that behind and overshadow-
7. FREUND. UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1949).
8. Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 62 HARV. L. REV.
357, 359 (1949).
9. 1 DE TOCQUVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AM'ERICA 355 (Bowen ed. 1862).
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ing our open commitment to the fragmentation of power lies a brood-
ing, inarticulate distrust of popular government. This finds expression
in judicial review, or what its detractors call judicial supremacy.
Whatever the name the essence is clear, concentration in a single
agency-significantly that'farthest removed from the people-of power
to supervise all other elements of government whether at the national,
state, or local level. Neither Congress nor President, no administrative
agency, no governor, no state court or legislature, not a single city or
county functionary is immune from the centralized power of judicial
review. Indeed in some eras the Court has been so domineering that
from time to time dissenters have felt compelled to remind it that the
judiciary is "not the only agency of government that must be assumed
to have capacity to govern." Equally pointed reminders have come
from the outside. Most of the great leaders of American democracy,
Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Bryan and the two Roosevelts, among
others, on occasion have challenged the practice of judicial review.
But except- perhaps in some academic circles the principle has with-
stood abuse and criticism. It stands only a shade less firmly grounded
in our polity than its counterpart, the dispersion of power.
The Supreme Court, then, is caught between basic principles that
look in different directions. Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems more sensi-
tive to the pinch than most, though doubtless no one in his position is
immune. What is the judge's role in such an impass? A common
"compromise" has been to emphasize diffusion or judicial supremacy
according to the nature of the interest before the Court. At least since
the Civil War some judges have demonstrated a marked propensity to
assert their supremacy for the benefit of "private property" while
other have shown a tendency to distrust the principle of diffusion only
when "personal liberty" is at issue. For Mr. Justice Frankfurter such
compromises only underscore the lawless quality of the Court's power.
Deeply libertarian in private thought and action, he sees what parti-
sans do not see: that while effective transcendental arguments may be
made for the social priority of personal liberty, no less powerful
considerations in the abstract would sustain the primacy of economic
interests. What Wilmon Sheldon said of philosophers seems relevant
to those who hold to either extreme. They are generally right in what
they affirm of their own vision and generally wrong in what they
deny in the vision of others. There is more subtlety, more depth and
more complexity in our culture than such one-sided polemics dream
of. We may be proud of the golden thread of liberalism that runs
through American thought, but it is futile to pretend the "acquisitive
instinct" and the old Whiggish concern for property are not as deep
in our culture. As Daniel Webster put it long ago, "Life and personal
liberty are, no doubt, to be protected by law; but property is also to be
1957]
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protected by law, and is the fund out of which the means for protecting
life and liberty are usually furnished."' 0 President Hadley of Yale
spoke for many when he explained the Constitution as a "set of limita-
tions on the political power of the majority in favor of the political
power of the property owner."" Such suggestions of the primacy of
economic interests are wormwood to liberals, but the disease is deep.
Man must eat and, not less important, he must "know where his next
meal is coming from." Our cold-war experience in the "backward"
areas of the world suggests that those who must choose are far more
interested in economic security than in civil liberty. In any event it is
important that neither is fungible and neither in the abstract is ever
at stake in litigation. Typically some finite facet of one or both is
imperiled and certainly in the kind of cases that now reach the
Supreme Court the context is often such that intelligent men may
differ as to whether a legitimate interest or its abuse is involved. This
is what Holmes meant when he said that "general propositions do not
decide concrete cases." Or, in Mr. Justice Cardozo's words, "Many an
appeal to freedom is the masquerade of privilege or inequality seeking
to entrench itself behind the catchword of a principle.' 2 For the pur-
pose of settling specific litigation abstract arguments as to the relative
importance of personal as against proprietary interests are as futile
as medieval arguments about realism and nominalism. They cut
no wood. Morris Cohen has called "attention to the fact that the
traditional dilemmas, on which people have for a long time taken
opposite stands, generally rest on difficulties rather than real contra-
dictions, and that positive gains.., can be made not by simply trying
to prove that one side or the other is the truth, but by trying to get
at the difficulty and determining in what respect and to what extent
each side is justified."' 3 This principle of polarity is the foundation
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's jurisprudence. He cannot be true to the
American tradition and ignore either the diffusion of power or judicial
supremacy. Least of all can he accept reconciliation which raises now
one and then another cluster of interests to a "preferred position" and
correspondingly defers others.
Of course, when the Constitution speaks clearly there is no problem.
The constant difficulty is that for many purposes it speaks in quite
Delphic terms. This indeed is its genius. To resolve their doubts and
disagreements, to accommodate the unknowable future, the Founding
10. For a brief survey of this tradition in America see FREUND, Op. Cit. supra
note 7, at 14-17, where the quotation from Webster will be f6und.
11. The Constitutional Position of Property in America, 64 THE INDEPENDENT
838 (1908). When he is addressing outsiders even that great libertarian, Mr.
Justice Douglas, recognizes that the security of property is "one of the pre-
ferred rights." DouGLAs, WE THE JUDGES 288-89 (1956).
12. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARv. L. REV. 682, 687-88 (1931).
13. CO HEN, REASON AND NATURE 11 (2d ed. 1953).
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Fathers (like the amenders) often wrote with inspired vagueness.
Each generation's birthright then is to find its own wisdom-or the
opposite-in the ancient document. And so the Constitution lives
despite unforeseen vicissitudes because it derives vitality from the
life about it. That is why so much depends upon the particular factual
context in which constitutional issues arise. Mr. Justice Brandeis
taught us anew, when we were in danger of forgetting it, that law is
born of fact. "Ex facto jus oritur. That ancient rule must prevail in
order that we may have a system of living law."'14 The facts after all
make up the issue. The precise problem of a minimum wage case,' 5
for example, is evaded, not solved, by invoking the abstraction "liberty
of contract," just as Terminiello's case16 is not solved by "reiterating
generalized approbations of freedom of speech." A Brandeis Brief is as
relevant in the one situation as in the other, if the Court is to decide
real, not hypothetical, cases. Of course a judge can derive anything
from an hypothesis that he puts into it.17
All this is obvious to liberals in application to the "nine old men,"
and to conservatives in reference to liberals. Seldom because of his
blinding dogmas does either liberal or conservative see it in his own
case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter tries to see it both ways. Accordingly
for him the substitution of judicial judgment for the judgment of
those to whom primary governmental responsibility has been given
can never be justified by amorphous proprietarian or libertarian gen-
eralities. If the Constitution is to be a living instrument of government,
the breath of life must come from the community-not from the
"can't helps" of a few "independent" judges. It follows that judicial
interference with the extrajudicial processes of government is per-
missible only when the concrete facts of a specific case leave no room
for doubt, i.e., when the Court is prepared to hold that no reasonable
mind could support the challenged legislative view.18 This is to say
simply that uncertainty is to be resolved in favor of the wisdom and
integrity of sister organs of government and the people to whom they
14. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 600 (1917).
15. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
16. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
17. The majority's position in the Terminiello case, supra, is a classic
example of the libertarian tendency to ignore circumstances in favor of
abstractions. As Mr. Justice Jackson put it, "The Court reverses this
conviction by reiterating generalized approbations of freedom of speech
with which, in the abstract, no one will disagree. Doubts as to their ap-
plicability are lulled by avoidance of more than passing reference to the
circumstances of Terminiello's speech and judging it as if he had spoken
to persons as dispassionate as empty benches .... But the local court that
tried Terminiello was not indulging in theory. It was dealing with a riot and
with a speech that provoked a hostile mob and incited a friendly one, and
threatened violence between the two." Id. at 13.
18. This is simply an old adaption of the ancient principle governing
the division of function between jury and court. Thus the two authentic




are responsible. For doubt entails choice and choice in a democracy
belongs to the political processes. Thus would Mr. Justice Frankfurter
reconcile judicial supremacy with diffusion of the power to govern.19
Judicial libertarians accept this approach not merely as orthodox
but as sound in all cases involving the regulation of economic interests.
Indeed they question it only with respect to First Amendment free-
doms-on the ground that these and these alone are fundamental in
the democratic process. 20 But how deep is his respect for democracy
who will not trust it with basic problems-who will not honor even
those results of the democratic processes which by hypothesis, if
debatable, are not clearly wrong, i.e., not plainly proscribed by
generally recognized legal norms?
Wise and devoted democrats believe that we threaten freedom when
we send the communist leaders to jail, as in the Dennis case.2 1 Equally
wise and devoted democrats believe that we unduly jeopardize free-
dom if we do not send them to jail. Neither position, one suggests, is
demonstrably true or false, or unequivocally written in the constitu-
tion.22 In such a case, Aristotle long ago observed, even those who
demand the rule of law know that man (not law) must make the
choice, but they will insist that it be made by many, not by one or a
few!2 3 Ringing down through the ages, this thought finds an echo in
Thomas Reed Powell's final summation: "[W]hat I most object to in
many Justices is something that springs from a feeling of judicial duty
to try to make out that their conclusions come from the Constitution. 24
Despite unqualified language in some parts of the Bill of Rights, no
past or present member of the Court has even suggested that any of
19. It will not do to say that the Justice's special willingness to remove
state burdens on interstate commerce violates the diffusion principle by con-
centrating control in the judiciary. Along with the Court, he leaves the final
word on such matters to Congress. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona
ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). All agree of course that, if we
are to be a nation, the last word must be left to some national agency rather
than to the individual states.
If it be said that diffusion would be better served by a more willing
assertion of judicial control in free expression cases, surely the answer is
that by resolving doubt in favor of the political processes we increase,
rather than diminish the power and responsibility of the people. The
Justice's reluctance to intrude in the case of grossly unequal electoral dis-
tricts is due not to "reasonable doubt," but to the inadequacy of judicial reme-
dies. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
20. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945). We skip
the question of whether some other provisions of the Bill of Rights are not
equally fundamental and whether indeed all First Amendment freedoms are
"indispensable" to democracy. English experience, for example, demonstrates
that democracy and an established church may thrive together. Can the free
exercise of religion be deemed one of democracy's processes?
21. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
22. See Mendelson, Clandestine Speech and the First Amendment-A Re-
appraisal of the Dennis Case, 51 MICH. L. REv. 553 (1953).
23. See McILwAIN, THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST 88
(1932).
24. POWELL, op. cit. supra note 6, at 179.
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its liberties are unlimited. As with the "rights of property" the only
question has been when and how they may be qualified. Whom do
we fool by calling this process constitutional interpretation? It is in
fact law-making and no less so in the hands of liberals than in the
hands of conservatives. Thus, it is one thing for Mr. Justice Frankfur-
ter (in a conciliatory gesture?) to concede that certain civil liberties
""come to this Court with a [special] 'momentum of respect": it is
something quite different to buttress that respect with a presumption
of invalidity for legislative law and use it as a substitute for judgement
upon the peculiar facts of a concrete controversy.25
Some insist that extended judicial review in First Amendment cases
is a desirable instrument of public education. The argument sounds
strange in the mouths of its liberal sponsors. By their standards, most
of the Court's teaching in this area has been erroneous. But right or
wrong, the fate of the "nine old men" suggests that judicial precept
is somewhat less than effective pedagogy. In Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
view responsibility is a more reliable educator. We practice intolerance
and expect the Court to save our freedom. History does not demon-
strate that those upon whom we rely may be trusted to do for us what
we lack conviction or will to do for ourselves. 26 This is not mere
chance. The stream "of the law cannot habitually rise above its source.
"The law must have an authority supreme over the will of the in-
dividual, and such an authority can -arise only from a background of
social acquiescence, which gives it the voice of indefinitely greater
numbers than those of its expositors. Thus, the law surpasses the de-
liverances of even the most exalted of its prophets; the momentum -of
its composite will alone makes it effective to coerce the individual
and reconciles him to his subservience. The pious traditionalism of
the law has its root in a sound conviction of this necessity; it must
be content to lag behind the best inspiration of its time until-it feels
behind it the weight of such general acceptance- as will give sanction
to its pretension to unquestioned dictation."2 7 Or as Mr. Justice Car-
dozo observed, "The law will not hold the crowd to the morality of
saints and seers."28 To build a jurisprudence of freedom upon the lag
25. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949).
26. As Mr. Justice Jackson put it, "In Great Britain, to observe civil liber-
ties is good politics and to transgress the rights of the individual or the
minority is bad politics. In the United States, I cannot say that this is so."
JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 82
(1955).
27. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 15-16 (2d ed., Dilliard 1953). Presumably the
segregation case, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), pre-
sented a situation in which a Court finally felt behind it "the weight of
such general acceptance" as would justify a decision which "the best in-
spiration" of the community had long since demanded.
28. CARDozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 274 (1947). The dissenting opinion perhaps is
a proper place for recording the "best inspiration of the time"; for instruction
in moral values still struggling for general, i.e. political, acceptance.
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between the public ethos and its reflection on the bench is to build
upon what at best is transient and generally least available when
needed most. Only for the protection of moribund economic claims
have Anglo-American Courts shown substantial ability to withstand
public opinion for extended periods! In sustaining such interests,
courts have the support of influential segments of the community, the
very forces indeed to which judges by training and background are
apt to be most responsive. Judicial protection of "radical agitators"
-can claim no similar support. On the contrary this typically entails
paddling against a strong stream of public emotion of a kind which
economic controversy seldom arouses. It is one thing to expect judges
to be reasonably up-to-date: it is something else to expect them to be
ahead of their times.
When the Court strikes down a compulsory flag-salute in public
schools,29 liberals may cheer and be "educated," but an intolerant
community will find a thousand ways to indulge its bigotry which no
judicial process can reach. At best legal remedies are slow and costly.
For this and other practical reasons, few victims of human cruelty can
go to court. Hence, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's constant warning that,
"Only a persistent positive translation of the liberal faith into the
thoughts and acts of the community is the real reliance against the
unabated temptation to straightjacket the human mind.... Hyde Park
represents a devotion to free speech far more dependable in its as-
surances . . . than reliance upon the litigious process for its enjoy-
ment.",2 0 The fate of Sacco and Vanzetti must have left its mark upon
their chief defender!
How persistently in practice does Mr. Justice Frankfurter honor
these principles? Those who know him know how frequently as a
judge he sustains policies which as a private citizen, or a legislator,
he would condemn. As a matter of statistics his record of intrusion
upon legislative law is relatively quite moderate.31 Still he does intrude
-sometimes in cases which others find not free of constitutional doubt.
The major instances, perhaps, are the church-state cases.2 Can it be
29. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
30. FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLTICS 197 (1949); FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND
MEN 26 (1956).
31. Surely it is significant that the Justice is not to be outdone in strict
enforcement of meticulous standards in federal prosecutions where there is
no problem of deference due a legislature or a state. See, e.g., On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947); Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939);
Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939). Cf. Sibbach v. Wilson Co., 312
U.S. 1 (1941). See McCloskey, The Supreme Court Finds a Role: Civil Liber-
ties in the 1955 Term, 42 VA. L. REV. 735 (1956), as to the Justice's leader-
ship in what is called "non-substantive scrutiny."
32. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1 (1947). In cases like Joseph Brustyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
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said that the First. and Fourteenth Amendments speak more clearly
on such matters than on flag salutes?m And, aside from the possibility
of doubt, why not judicial restraint in the Segregation cases because
of enforcement problems?35 If these in fact entail silent departures
from Frankfurtian humility, it may be significant that they seem to
hang on a common thread. All involve the public schools. Felix Frank-
furter was not born into our society. Coming to it as immigrant boy
with an alien tongue, he lived his first American years in an old-
world enclave. The public schools provided his entree into this coun-
try's fellowship. To this day he revers with tender thoughts that
unsung Irish schoolmarm who with wit and sympathy-and sometimes
with a ruler-led him over the first steps into what Holmes called
"the one club to which we all belong." For such a one no doubt public
schools have a meaning only dimly grasped by those who are born
to the estate. And so when religious and racial parochialism threatens
the great melting-pot of our educational system it may be that Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's feelings impinge upon his logic.
36
Administrative Law: Just as in constitutional law Mr. Justice Frank-
furter finds in "reasonable doubt" a catalyst for reconciling legisla-
tive and judicial functions, so in administrative law he sees "expertise'
as the harmonizing agent in the clash between administrative dis-
cretion and the rule of law.37 This is simply another aspect of the
principle of specialization and the division of labor. Here activism
again acquires an economic content, though one quite different of
course from that espoused by the old regime. In short, modern activism
would leave esoteric matters for those specially competent to deal
with them-unless the results offend liberal (read New Deal) tenets.
The crux of the matter is seen in Professor E. M. Dodd's study of
National Labor Relations Board orders reviewed by the Court during
a crucial four year period. The Board was successful in seventeen out
of twenty-one cases. The record, concluded Professor Dodd, "demon-
strates that the Supreme Court is now insisting that circuit courts of
appeals must give the Board a free hand to administer its statute, with
495 (1952); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952)
and Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), Mr. Justice Frankfurter does
not deny legislative power, he simply urges the "procedural" consideration
that in exercising its power a legislature must speak with sufficient clarity to
provide potential violators, defendants and law-enforcing officers with "as-
certainable standards of guilt."
33. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Minersville School
District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
34. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. Cf. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). See also note 30 supra
and related text.
36. It was perhaps crucial for the Justice that Minersville in which the
Gobitis case arose was a polyglot community struggling with the problem
of Americanizing its numerous, conflicting, old-world elements.
37. We are referring here to cases in which relevant legislation is less
than clear as to the scope of judicial review of administrative action.
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a minimum of judicial interference.... This judicial attitude is ex-
plicable to some extent as a specific application of a general tendency
to limit judicial interference with administrative agencies in their
performance of the duties which the legislature has imposed upon
them. But it is clear that the Board's string of victories has not been
due solely to the Supreme Court's general attitude toward adminis-
trative agencies. For a majority of the members of the Court-and
particularly [the activists] Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and
Rutledge, the Justices who have been the most unwilling to set aside
anything which the Labor Board has done-have during the same four
terms of court shown considerably less reluctance to reverse the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, an administrative agency at present
somewhat out of favor in so-called liberal circles." 38 During the period
in question ICC orders were sustained in only nine out of sixteen
cases.39 That respect for the administrative process was more com-
-pelling for Mr. Justice Frankfurter and that regard for "liberal" re-
sults was more weighty for Mr. Justice Black-the leader of the
activists-is suggested by their contrasting positions in these two
-groups of cases. Mr. Justice Black voted to sustain the NLRB in
twenty out of twenty-one instances, the ICC in only three out of
sixteen. The percentages are approximately ninety-five and eighteen
respectively. Mr. Justice Frankfurter on the other hand voted to
sustain the NLRB in sixteen out of twenty-one cases and the ICC
in thirteen out of sixteen. Here the percentage figures are roundly
eighty-one and seventy-six respectively.
Statutory Construction: In the telltale field of statutory interpreta-
tion (free ot administrative law considerations) the pattern is repeated.
IHere the principle of polarity leads Mr. Justice Frankfurter to seek
the meaning of a doubtful statute in the legislative compromise, the
balance of social pressures, that produced it. The activists are apt
to find that meaning-where a New Deal measure is involved-in the
hopes of the statute's sponsors without benefit of legislative adjust-
-ment.40 For example, the primary problem in the enforcement of the
'Fair Labor Standards Act has been dispute as to the scope of its
-coverage. As introduced to his colleagues by Senator Hugo Black in
38. Dodd, The Supreme Court and Organized Labor, 1941-1945, 58 HAnV. L.
REV. 1018, 1066-67 (1945). See also Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC,
-61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952).
39. See Dodd, supra note 38, at 1067 & n.174.
40. See, Mendelson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter on the Construction of Statutes,
43 CALIF. L. REV. 652 (1955). As to the activists' reading of Old Deal legisla-
tion, see the discussion of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, infra. Where
personal freedom is involved Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems to follow the
ancient tradition that penalizing measures are to be construed in case of
doubt so as not to "squeeze the Act .. . [to make it] yield every possible
hardship of which its words are susceptible." United States ex rei. Eichen-
laub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521, 533 (1950).
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New Deal days the embryo of that measure invoked the full scope of
congressional commerce power.41 But after sustained oppositioi by
powerful forces it emerged in much compromised form.42 Again Pro-
fessor Dodd's statistics are instructive. "Employer victories would
have been much more numerous if the views.., of Mr. Justice Roberts
had uniformly prevailed, but would have been few indeed if Justices
Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge had always been able to get
one other member of the Court to agree with them. For hardly more
than a third of the decisions were unanimous. There were dissents by
Mr. Justice Roberts in twelve cases, by Mr. Chief Justice Stone in
seven and by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in two-all of them dissents
from decisions adverse to an employer. On the other hand, there were
dissents by Mr. Justice Black in seven cases, by Mr. Justice Douglas
in seven, by Mr. Justice Murphy in six, by Mr. Justice Rutledge
[who was on the bench for only a small part of the period in question]
in four ... all of them cases in which the Court's decision was in favor
of the employer."
43
Thus, at one extreme Mr. Justice Roberts of the old guard read the
FLSA narrowly which must have comforted those who had opposed
it at the legislative level. On the other extreme the libertarians found
in the same language something strikingly close to the ideals of the
sponsors of the original bill. If these positions are incompatible, neither
is demonstrably false. For in effecting a balance between the sponsor's
hopes and the opposition's fears Congress used terms of less than
crystal clarity. The problem is common, for ambiguity is a frequent
vehicle of legislative compromise. "Such laws," says Learned Hand,
"need but one canon of interpretation, [namely] to understand what
the real accord was."4 Thus, Mr. Justice Frankfurter found in the
FLSA an intermediate meaning distasteful to those whose sense of
Justice puts them at either extreme-just as the congressional com-
promise was distasteful to Senator Black and also to his advisaries.
For Congress plainly avoided unequivocal commitment to either side.
To disturb such a settlement by judicial interpolation is to undermine
those processes of give and take by which democracy achieves a work-
able balance of social forces. It is ironical that those who in the name
of the democratic process would give free speech a "preferred posi-
tion" seem least respectful of legislative compromise in other fields.
41. Joint Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Education ard Labor
rnd the House Committee on Labor, S. REP. 2475 and H. R. REP. 2700, 75 Cong.,
1st Sess. 54, 58-62 (1937).
42. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 464, 468-69 (1939).
43. Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941-1945, 59
HARv. L. REv. 321, 372-73 (1946). Not all of the cases referred to turn on
the commerce clause problem. All of them spring out of dubious language
permitting play of private preference.
44. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 157 (2d ed., Dilliard 1953).
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There is little point in full discussion and the other tools of freedom,
if the legislative fruits thereof are to be stifled by judicial Justice.
Perhaps the most generally condemned of all Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's opinions is that in United States v. Hutcheson45 where, its
critics urge, in order to avoid a niggardly, old construction of one
statute, he read much more into another than was plainly there. This
case, plus two others46 also early in his judicial career, suggests that
the Justice at first may have been more willing to stretch a statute-
or at least to abandon established "misconstructions"-than he has
been in later years.47 Perhaps the change (if such it be) was induced
by the widespread criticism of Hutcheson's case-and perhaps too by
the increasingly obvious instrumentalism of some of his colleagues.
Certiorari Policy: In the exercise of the discretionary power to issue
writs of certiorari a judge's inclination for or against activism must be
crucial. Normally, of course, such matters are treated per curiam.
Only rarely is a separate opinion recorded. But Federal Employers'
Liability Act litigation reveals something of what transpires in the
conference room. Unlike more modern state workmen's compensation
statutes based on the concept of insurance, the FELA rests upon
negligence principles. An injured laborer, that is, can recover only
when he proves proximate negligence on the part of his employer.
Some of the bite of this highly illiberal measure can be at least miti-
gated, if four Justices (four control for certiorari purposes) are es-
pecially willing to reconsider the evidence in cases where the lower
courts have found no liability. In Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view, this
is precisely what has happened,48 quite contrary to the raison d'etre
of certiorari. Crucial for him, in addition to the matter of statutory
construction, is the same polarity principle that he finds controlling in
the relation between administrative discretion and rule of law, i.e.,
specialization and the division of labor. As he put it in Wilkenson v.
McCarthy, "Considering the volume and complexity of the cases
which obviously call for decision by this Court, and considering the
time and thought that the proper disposition of such cases demands, I
45. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
46. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United
States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
47. Cf. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). As to penal measures
see note 40 supra.
48. See the bitter remarks of a United States Circuit Court in Griswold
v. Gardner, 155 F.2d 333 (1946). "Any detailed review of the evidence
in a case of this character for the purpose of determining the propriety of
the trial court's refusal to direct a verdict would be an idle and useless cere-
mony in the light of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court. This is so
regardless of what we may think of the sufficiency of the evidence in this re-
spect. The fact is, so we think, that the Supreme Court has in effect converted
this negligence statute into a compensation law thereby making, for all prac-
tical purposes, a railroad an insurer of its employees." Id. at 333-34.
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do not think we should take cases merely to review facts already
canvassed by two and sometimes three courts even though those facts
may have been erroneously appraised. The division of this Court would
seem to demonstrate beyond peradventure that, nothing is involved
in this case except the drawing of allowable inferences from a neces-
sarily unique set of circumstances. For this Court to take a case which
turns merely on such an appraisal of evidence, however much hard-
ship in the fallible application of an archaic system . . . may touch
our private sympathy, is to deny due regard to the considerations
which led the Court to ask and Congress to give power to control the
Court's docket. Such power carries with it the responsibility of grant-
ing review only in cases that demand adjudication on the basis of
importance to the operation of our federal system; importance of the
outcome merely to the parties is not enough.
'49
The Justice then observes that what is at stake cannot be appreciated
in the perspective of a single case. "Despite the mounting burden of
this Court's business, this is the thirtieth occasion in which . . .
certiorari has been granted during the past decade to review a judg-
ment denying recovery . . . in a case turning solely on jury issues.
The only petition on behalf of [an employer] that brought such a case
here during this period was dismissed . . . ,,10 There follows a broad
hint as to who is responsible.
Justices Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge answered by way of con-
fession and avoidance. 51 Mr. Justice Black apparently was with them
in spirit. For as their Brother Frankfurter suggests, "Of course, some
light on the situation is derivatively shed by the disclosed position of
the Justices on the merits of the cases. '52 According to Professor
Pritchett, "In 23 nonunanimous decisions in federal workmen's com-
pensation [sic] cases from 1946 to 1952, none of the four libertarian ac-
tivists ever cast a vote against an employee claim. '53 So convinced was
Mr. Justice Frankfurter of the perversion of certiorari in these cases
that shortly after the crises of Wilkenson v. McCarthy he took the un-
usual step of refusing to vote on the merits. "Again and again and again
has it been authoritatively announced that controversies such as this
are not for this Court. Nor does it follow that because the case in fact
was brought here and has been argued, the merits should be decided.
The short answer is that to entertain this kind of case inevitably will
encourage petitions for certiorari in other like cases .... Thus, will
49. 336 U.S. 53, 66-67 (1949). The Judiciary Act of 1916 was adopted pri-
marily to free the Court of FELA appeals as of right. See FRANKFURTER AND
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 206-14 (1928).
50. Wilkenson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 67 (1949).
51. Id. at 68.
52. Id. at 67.
53. PRITCHETT, CIWL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 276 n.14 (1954).
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again begin demands on the Court which it wisely cannot discharge
and for which legislative relief had to come, or a feeling of discrimina-
tion will be engendered in taking some cases that ought not to be taken
and rejecting others."5 4 "The only effective way to respect these con-
siderations is to cease acquiescence in their disregard." 55
Is Mr. Justice Frankfurter's "narrow" view of certiorari simply the
reflection of an ulterior policy purpose? 56 The fact is his disclosed
position in FELA cases leads to sharply "conservative" results. But
his insistence upon administrative law principles in NLRB cases
brings markedly "liberal" results. His constructions of the FLSA on
the other hand are more nearly middling. A common element in these
cases is that each is an incident in the so-called struggle between labor
and capital. Apparently, sympathy for one side or the other was less
important for Mr. Justice Frankfurter than the distinctive and gen-
erally recognized legal considerations by which he measured each of
the three different problems. It may of course be merely coincidence
that the activist position in each situation had a plainly New Deal, i.e.,
"pro-labor," thrust. Perhaps, too, it is only chance that activism in the
1940's found "administrative law" skeptical of the conservative ICC
and tolerant of the liberal NLRB-whereas activism in the 1920's
found in "administrative law" a special reverence for the safe, rail-
road-minded ICC and hostility towards the Federal Trade Commis-




If, as tradition holds, the law is a jealous mistress, it also has the
feminine capacity to tempt each devotee to find his own image in her
bosom. No one escapes entirely. Some yield blindly, some with sophis-
tication. A few more or less effectively resist-Cardozo, because he
could not quite forget that ethic of self-denial which man has never
mastered; Holmes, from the hopeful scepticism of an inquiring mind;
Frankfurter, largely perhaps, from remembrance of things past. Surely
willfulness on the bench prior to 1937 was a catalyst in the making of
all the "Roosevelt judges." Some of them with appropriate justifica-
cations seemed to fly to an opposite willfulness.5 8 Mr. Justice Frank-
54. McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 24 (1954).
55. Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry., 338 U.S. 430, 439 (1949). At
least two more Justices seem now to have adopted Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
tactics. See Cahill v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 350 U.S. 898 (1955) [This per
curiam order granting certiorari and reversing the lower court's decision was
later amended, 351 U.S. 183 (1956).]
56. Max Lerner long ago urged that Holmes' humility was merely a cloak
to serve his private purposes. Professor Frankfurter was "unpersuaded
and impenitent." See LERNER, IDEAS ARE WEAPONS 64, 69 n.8 (1940).
57. See MCFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1933) (especially c. 5).
58. See note 6 supra and related text.
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furter has tried to subsume will to law and where the law is vague
judicial will to the will of the community. If he falters, is it that his
grasp is short, or that his reach is long? The discrepancy, Robert
Browning tells us, is "what a heaven's for." Meanwhile clearly such
a judge must carry a heavier burden than does he whose commitment
to proprietarian or libertarian abstractions-whose sense of Justice-
is automatically decisive. "Believing it still important to do so," Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, has "tried to dispel the age-old illusion that the
conflicts to which the energy and ambition and imagination of the
restless human spirit give rise can be subdued ... by giving the en-
deavors of reason we call law a mechanical or automatic or enduring
configuration. Law cannot be confined within any such mold because
life cannot be so confined." 59 The Justice knows the essential wisdom
of "Lord Nottingham's answer," and the contrasting vapidity of horn-
books. He has lived too long with the law to be fooled by the simple
antinomy. Abraham Lincoln made the point when he cut short the
ranting of a Northern extremest, "Mr. , haven't you
lived long enough to know that two men may honestly differ about a
question and both be right?"60 In this paradox lies the genius of our
system. "Often 'the American Way of Life' is pictured in terms of
rigid adherence to some idealogy, ignoring that our search for 'a
more perfect union' has been directed less to seeking final solutions
than at establishing a tolerable balance of conflict among ourselves."'61
Tolstoi saw that a great leader never leads. Does a great judge? At
least for cases that reach the Supreme Court the law is seldom clear.
The typical controversy entails a clash of interests each of which has
some, but no plainly preponderant, legal foundation. Yet the Court is
expected to give a decision.62 And so perhaps in the end the intrinsic
problem is this: for whom or in what direction shall doubt be resolved?
Some have made uncertainty the servant of selected economic in-
terests. Others have been guided by more generous considerations.
In Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view this "sovereign prerogative of
choice" is not for judges. He would resolve all reasonable doubt in
favor of the integrity of sister organs of government and the people
to whom they must answer. He would adhere, that is, to the deepest
of all our constitutional traditions, the dispersion of power-though,
as in the Flag Salute cases, the immediate result offend his own gener-
ous heart's desire. He is wary of judicial attempts to impose Justice
on the community, i.e., to deprive it of the wisdom that comes from
self-inflicted wounds and the strength that grows with the burden
59. FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 28 (1956).
60. Quoted in SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN 660 (one vol. ed. 1954).
61. LUBELL, REVOLT OF THE MODERATES 239 (1956).
62. It might be otherwise, if we believed as deeply as we pretend in the
rule of law, i.e., if we did not confuse the rule of law with the rule of judges.
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of responsibility. It is his deepest conviction that no five men, or
nine, are wise enough, or good enough to wield such power over the
lives of millions. In his view humanitarian ends are served best in
that allocation of function through which the people by a balance of
power seek their own destiny. True to the faith upon which democracy
ultimately rests, the Justice would leave to the political processes the
onus of building legal standards in the vacuum of doubt. For in his
view only that people is free who chooses for itself when choice must
be made.
